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Power Control against Active Eavesdropping
Tiep M. Hoang, Hien Quoc Ngo, Trung Q. Duong, Hoang D. Tuan, and Alan
Marshall
Abstract
This paper studies the security aspect of a recently introduced network (“cell-free massive MIMO”)
under a pilot spoofing attack. Firstly, a simple method to recognize the presence of this type of an
active eavesdropping attack to a particular user is shown. In order to deal with this attack, we consider
the problem of maximizing the achievable data rate of the attacked user or its achievable secrecy rate.
The corresponding problems of minimizing the consumption power subject to security constraints are
also considered in parallel. Path-following algorithms are developed to solve the posed optimization
problems under different power allocation to access points (APs). Under equip-power allocation to APs,
these optimization problems admit closed-form solutions. Numerical results show their efficiencies.
Index terms—Cell-free, channel estimation, pilot spoofing attack, active eavesdropping, inner
convex approximation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Previous Works
1) Cell-free massive MIMO networks: Cell-free massive MIMO has been recently introduced
in [1]–[3]. These papers showed that by proper implementation, cell-free massive MIMO can
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2provide a uniformly good service to all users in the network and outperform small-cell massive
MIMO in terms of throughput, and handle the shadow fading correlation more efficiently. In
a typical small-cell massive MIMO system, the channel from an access point (AP) to a user
is a single scalar. In contrast, in a cell-free Massive MIMO system, all APs can liaise with
each other via a central processing unit (CPU) to perform beamforming transmission tasks,
and thus the effective channel (from an AP to a user) will take the form of an inner product
between two vectors [2]. That inner product can converge to its mean when the length of each
vector (equivalently, the number of APs) is large enough. As a result, the effective channel also
converges to a constant and there is no need to estimate downlink channels in the massive MIMO
systems using cell-free architecture, while the small-cell counterpart may require both downlink
and uplink training for channel estimation.
Inspired by [1]–[3], cell-free massive MIMO has been further studied in [4]–[7]. Cell-free
massive MIMO was modified in [4] to allow each AP serving only several users based on the
strongest channels instead of serving all users. The joint user association and interference/power
control to mitigate the interference and cell-edge effect was considered in [5]. The problem of
designing zero-forcing precoders to maximize the energy efficiency for cell-free massive MIMO
networks was considered in [6]. We are motivated to investigate the security aspect of cell-free
massive MIMO as it was not considered in these papers.
2) Pilot spoofing attack: Recently, active eavesdropping has attracted the researchers’ attention
to physical layer security. It has been proved that active eavesdroppers are more dangerous than
passive eavesdroppers because confidential information leaked to the active eavesdroppers is
possibly higher [8]. Active eavesdropping is an interesting topic which has been emerging in
recent years. For instance, active eavesdroppers are capable of jamming as well as eavesdropping
[9]–[11] and/or they can send spoofing pilot sequences [8], [12], [13]. The latter scenario relates
to the so-called pilot spoofing attacks [8], [12]. Eavesdropping attacks caused by an active
eavesdropper is more harmful than passive ones. A feedback-based encoding scheme to improve
the secrecy of transmission was proposed in [12]. On the contrary, from an eavesdropping point
of view, [8] showed how an active eavesdropper achieves a satisfactory performance with the
use of transmission energy.
Initialized by [8], pilot spoofing attacks in wireless security have been actively studied [13]–
[18]. By assuming that an eavesdropper can attack a wireless communication system during
training phase to gain the amount of leaked information, the authors in [13]–[18] have studied
3pilot contamination attacks in distinct scenarios. Their results reveal that active eavesdropping
poses an actual threat to different types of wireless systems in general. More specifically, the
authors in [13] conducted a survey of detecting active attacks on massive MIMO systems. The
authors in [14] designed an artificial noise to cope with an active eavesdropper in a secure
massive MIMO system. The use of artificial noise is not necessary in the present paper as our
proposed optimization problems can also control beam steering towards intended destinations
such that security constraints are met. Meanwhile, the consideration of the authors in [15] is a
secret key generation, which is beyond the scope of our paper. In [16] a method called minimum
description length source enumeration is employed to detect an active eavesdropping attack in
a relaying network; however, the secure performance of the system (via metrics such as secrecy
rate or secrecy outage probability) is not evaluated. Other detection techniques can be found in
[17] and [18]. While [17] resort to the downlink phase to estimate channels and improve the
system performance, we only use one training phase to detect a potential eavesdropper (which is
presented in Appendix A). Our simple detection technique is similar to that in [18], which also
compares the asymmetry of received signal power levels to detect eavesdroppers. The differences
between [18] and our paper lie in modelling (massive MIMO networks versus cell-free networks)
and optimization formulations. Although the eavesdropping attack detection methods in [16]–
[18] are really attractive, we will not delve into similar methods and not consider such a method
as a major contribution. Instead, we focus on solving optimization problems to provide specific
solutions for cell-free systems in the case that a user is really suspected of being an eavesdropper.
B. Contributions
As discussed above, the introduction of a cell-free massive MIMO network can bring about
a huge chance of improving throughput in comparison with small-cell networks. We thus study
the security aspect of such a network and more importantly, this paper is the first work on
the integration of security with the cell-free massive MIMO architecture. On the other hand,
the analytical approach in this work is different from previous papers on security for massive
MIMO. The major difference is that we do not use the law of large number to formulate
approximate expressions for signal-to-noise (SNR) ratios. Instead, we consider lower- and upper-
bounds for SNR expressions, thereby a lower-bound for secrecy rate is formulated and evaluated.
This alternative approach, of course, holds true for general situations in which the number of
4nodes/antennas are not so many (and hence the term “massive” can be relatively understood
and/or can be also removed).
In this paper, we examine a cell-free network in which an eavesdropper is actively involved in
attacking the system during the training phase. We simply and shortly show that such an attack
is dangerous but can be detected by a simple detection mechanism. Thereby, efforts to deal with
active eavesdropping can be made and secure strategies can be prepared at APs during the next
phase (i.e. the downlink phase). With these in mind and with the aim of keeping confidential
information safe, we can realize beforehand which user is under attack and thus, we can propose
optimization problems based on secrecy criteria to protect that user from being overhead. Our
proposed optimization problems can be classified into 2 groups. For the first group, we design
a matrix of power control coefficients
• to maximize the achievable data rate of the user who is under attack (see III-A)
• to maximize the achievable secrecy rate of user 1 (see III-B)
• to minimize the total power at all APs subject to the constraints on the data rate of each
user, including all legitimate users and eavesdropper (see IV-A)
• to minimize the total power at all APs subject to the constraints on the achievable data rate
and the data rates of other users (i.e. legitimate users not under attack) (see IV-B).
For the second group, we design a common power control coefficient for all APs and consider
4 optimization problems (V-A, V-B, V-C and V-D), which are similar and comparable to their
counterparts in the first group. While the common goal of all maximization programs is achiev-
able secrecy rate, that of all minimization programs is power consumption at APs. Taking control
of power at each AP, we find the most suitable solutions to the proposed optimization problems
and compare them in secure performance as well as energy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model is presented.
In Section III, we propose two maximization problems to maximize achievable secrecy rate
subject to several quality-of-service constraints. In parallel, Section IV provides two minimization
problems to minimize the power consumption such that security constraints are still guaranteed.
In Section V, special cases of the proposed optimization problems are given for comparison
purposes. Simulation results and conclusions are given in Sections VI and VII, respectively.
Notation: [·]T , [·]∗, and [·]† denote the transpose operator, conjugate operator, and Hermitian
operator, respectively. [·]−1 and [·]+ denote the inverse operator and pseudo-inverse operator, re-
spectively. Vectors and matrices are represented with lowercase boldface and uppercase boldface,
5Fig. 1. A system model consisting of M APs, K legal users and one active eavesdropper Eve. The arrows point to the direction
from transmitters to receivers. All directions, connected to Eve, are in red. In uplink training phase, all users and Eve send the
pilots to the APs in order to request for the messages, which privately intended for them. Connected together through a CPU,
the APs exchange information, estimate channels and detect abnormality in pilot sequences. In downlink transmission phase,
the APs transmit their designed signals to users and Eve.
respectively. In is the n × n identity matrix. ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm. E {·} denotes
expectation. z ∼ CNn (z¯,Σ) denotes a complex Gaussian vector z ∈ Cn×1 with mean vector z¯
and covariance matrix Σ ∈ Cn×n.
II. CELL-FREE SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a system with M APs and K users in the presence of an active eavesdropper
(Eve). Each node is equipped with a single antenna and all nodes are randomly positioned. Let
gmk =
√
βmkhmk ∼ CN (0, βmk) be the downlink channel from the mth AP to the kth user.1 We
assume channel reciprocity between uplink and downlink. Similarly, let gmE ∼ CN (0, βmE) be
the channel between the mth AP and Eve. Note that the desirable property of channel reciprocity
requires the highly accurate calibration of hardware. In addition, the APs in cell-free massive
MIMO systems are connected to a CPU via backhaul, thereby they can share information. We
assume that the backhaul is perfect enough to consider error-free information only. Any limitation
on capacity (caused by imperfect backhaul) will be left for future work.
1In the formulation gmk =
√
βmkhmk , the term βmk represents the large scale fading, while the term hmk ∼ CN (0, 1)
implies the small scale fading. The value of βmk is constant and is based on a particular rule of power degradation. This rule
will be presented in Section VI, given that the Hata-COST231 propagation prediction model is used (see [19] and [20]).
6The transmission includes 2 phases: Uplink training for channel estimation and downlink data
transmission.
A. Uplink training
In this phase, the kth user sends a certain pilot vector pk ∈ CT×1 to all APs where T
is an integer number. If Lint denotes the coherence interval, then the first T symbols are for
pilot training and the (Lint − T ) remaining symbols are for data transmission. In low-mobility
environment, the coherence interval can take on large numbers. It is shown that if the vehicle
speed is 5.4 km/h, the coherence interval Lint can approach 15000 symbols (see [21, p.23]). With
such a large value of Lint, we can totally assign a sufficiently-large number to T such that the
inequality T ≥ K holds true. For example, (T,K) = (150, 100) is totally possible in practical
situations (note that T = 150 accounts for only 0.1% of Lint = 15000). In short, we can totally
have T ≥ K and then design K orthogonal pilot vectors such that p†kpk′ = 0 for k 6= k′ and
‖pk‖2 = 1. In general, p1, . . . ,pK are known to Eve because the pilot sequences of a system
are standardized and public. Taking advantage of this, Eve also sends its pilot sequence pE to
all APs. If Eve wants to detect the signal destined for the lth user, pE will be designed to be
the same as pl (see [8], [22], [23]). Without the loss of generality, let us consider the situation
in which Eve aims to overhear the confidential messages intended for the 1st user, i.e. pE = p1.
At the mth AP, the received pilot vector is given by
yp,m =
√
Tρu
K∑
k=1
gmkpk +
√
TρEgmEp1 +wm (1)
where ρu , Pu/N0 and ρE , PE/N0. Herein, Pu and PE are the average transmit power of each
user and that of Eve, respectively; while N0 is the average noise power per a receive antenna.
wm is an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector with wm ∼ CN (0, I). Projecting yp,m
onto p
†
k, we can write the post-processing signal ykm = p
†
kyp,m as
2
ykm =


√
Tρugmk + p
†
kwm, k 6= 1√
Tρugm1 +
√
TρEgmE + p
†
1wm, k = 1
. (2)
It is of crucial importance that all APs are not aware of an eavesdropping attack until they have
realized an abnormal sign from the sequence of signals {ykm} in (2). Based on that abnormal
2 If we assumed T < K (i.e. p†
k
pk′ 6= 0 for k 6= k′), there would be the presence of the term
√
Tρu
∑
K
k′ 6=k gmk′p
†
k
pk′ in
(2). Other changes could also be made and the framework of this paper could be re-applied.
7sign, APs can identify the pilot which might be harmed. Therefore, it is necessary for APs to
have a method to observe abnormality from {ykm}. We describe such a method in Appendix A.
Besides, with the aim of estimating gmk and gmE from (2), the MMSE method is adopted at
the mth AP, i.e.
gˆmk =


√
Tρuβmk
Tρuβmk + 1
ykm, k 6= 1√
Tρuβm1
Tρuβm1 + TρEβmE + 1
y1m, k = 1
(3)
and
gˆmE =
√
ρE
ρu
βmE
βm1
gˆm1. (4)
Let us denote
γmk , E
{|gˆmk|2} =


Tρuβ
2
mk
Tρuβmk + 1
, k 6= 1
Tρuβ
2
m1
Tρuβm1 + TρEβmE + 1
, k = 1
and γmE , E {|gˆmE|2} . Using (4), we can also rewrite
γmE = αmγm1
with αm = (ρEβ
2
mE) / (ρuβ
2
m1) . In association with the above, we state the following proposition
for later use in the rest of paper.
Proposition 1. gˆmk and gˆmk′ are uncorrelated for ∀k′ 6= k. At the same time, gˆmE and gˆmk′ are
uncorrelated for ∀k′ 6= 1. Furthermore, we have
E
{|gˆmkgˆ∗mk′|2} =

 γmkγmk′, k
′ 6= k
2γ2mk, k
′ = k
, (5)
and
E
{|gˆmEgˆ∗mk′|2} =

 αmγm1γmk′, k
′ 6= 1
2αmγ
2
m1, k
′ = 1
. (6)
Proof. It is straightforward to prove the uncorrelated-ness by showing E {gˆmkgˆ∗mk′} = 0 for
∀k′ 6= k and E {gˆmEgˆ∗mk′} = 0 for ∀k′ 6= 1. Using these results, we can obtain (5) and (6) with
the help of (2)–(4) and the definitions of γmk and γmE.
Note that the eavesdropper’s attack against the 1st user during the training phase leads to the
presence of ρE in the denominator of gˆm1 (which is called a pilot spoofing attack).
8B. Downlink transmisson
In this phase, the mth AP uses the estimate gˆmk to perform beamforming technique. First,
we denote sk be the signal intended for the kth user and Ps be the average transmit power
for a certain sk. Then the signal transmitted by the mth AP can be designed (according to
beamforming technique) as [2]
xm =
√
Ps
K∑
k=1
√
ηmkgˆ
∗
mksk (7)
with sk being normalized such that E {|sk|2} = 1. In (7), ηmk is the power control coefficient,
which corresponds to the downlink channel from the mth AP to the kth user.
As such, the received signal at the kth user and Eve are, respectively, given by
zk =
√
ρs
M∑
m=1
gmk
(
K∑
k=1
√
ηmkgˆ
∗
mksk
)
+ nk, (8)
zE =
√
ρs
M∑
m=1
gmE
(
K∑
k=1
√
ηmkgˆ
∗
mksk
)
+ nE (9)
where ρs = Ps/N0, nk ∼ CN (0, 1), and nE ∼ CN (0, 1).
1) The lower-bound for the mutual information between sk and zk: We rewrite (8) as
zk = DSk × sk + BUk × sk +
K∑
k′ 6=k
UIkk′ × sk′ + nk︸ ︷︷ ︸
treated as aggregated noise
, (10)
where
DSk ,
√
ρs
M∑
m=1
E {√ηmkgmkgˆ∗mk} ,
BUk ,
√
ρs
M∑
m=1
(
√
ηmkgmkgˆ
∗
mk − E {
√
ηmkgmkgˆ
∗
mk}) ,
UIkk′ ,
√
ρs
M∑
m=1
√
ηmk′gmkgˆ
∗
mk′
represent the strength of the desired signal sk, the beamforming gain uncertainty, and the
interference caused by the k′th user (with k′ 6= k), respectively. It is proved that the terms
DSk, BUk, UIkk′ and nk in (10) are pair-wisely uncorrelated.
Lemma 1. Let U and V be complex-valued random variables with U ∼ CN (0, var{U}) and
E {|V |2} = var{V }. Given that U and V are uncorrelated, then the mutual information I(U ;U+
9V ) between U and U + V is lower-bounded by log2 (1 + var{U}/var{V }). Consequently, the
lower-bound SNR can be given by var{U}/var{V }.
Proof. The reader is referred to [24] and [25] for detailed proofs in terms of information theory.
Let Ik (sk; zk) denote the mutual information between sk and zk. Considering the second,
third, and fourth terms in (10) as noises, the lower-bound for Ik (sk; zk) can be deduced from
Lemma 1 as follows:
Ik (sk; zk) ≥ log2(1 + snrk) (11)
where
snrk =
|DSk|2
E {|BUk|2}+
∑K
k′ 6=k E {|UIkk′|2}+ 1
=
ρs
(∑M
m=1
√
ηmkγmk
)2
ρs
∑K
k′=1
∑M
m=1 ηmk′γmk′βmk + 1
, k ∈ K (12)
with K = {1, 2, . . . , K}. The derivation of (12) is available in [2, Appendix A]. The right hand
side (RHS) of (11) is the achievable data rate of user k.
2) The upper-bound for the mutual information between s1 and zE: We rewrite (9) as
zE = BUE,1 × s1 +
K∑
k′ 6=1
UIE,k′ × sk′ + nE︸ ︷︷ ︸
treated as aggregated noise
. (13)
where
BUE,1 ,
√
ρs
M∑
m=1
√
ηm1gmEgˆ
∗
m1,
UIE,k′ ,
√
ρs
M∑
m=1
√
ηmk′gmEgˆ
∗
mk′
respectively represent the strength of the desired signal s1 (which Eve may want to overhear)
and the interference caused by the remaining users (with k′ 6= k). It is proved that the terms
BUE,k, UIE,kk′ and nE in (13) are pair-wisely uncorrelated. Thus, we can consider the second
and third terms in (13) as noises.
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Let IE (s1; zE) denote the mutual information between s1 and zE. Then the upper-bound for
IE (sk; zE) can be formulated as follows:
IE (s1; zE)
(a)
≤ IE
(
s1; zE
∣∣∣{gmk}m,k , {gˆmk}m,k , {gmE}m)
= E
{
log2
(
1 +
|BUE,1|2∑K
k′ 6=1 |UIE,k′|2 + 1
)}
(b)≈ log2 (1 + snrE) (14)
where
snrE =
E {|BUE,1|2}∑K
k′ 6=1E {|UIE,k′|2}+ 1
(15)
(c)
=
ρs
∑M
m=1 ηm1γm1
(
ρEβ
2
mE
ρuβ2m1
γm1 + βmE
)
ρs
∑K
k′ 6=1
∑M
m=1 ηmk′γmk′βmE + 1
. (16)
The RHS of inequality (a) means that Eve perfectly knows channel gains. It also implies the
worst case in terms of security. Meanwhile, the approximation (b) follows [26, Lemma 1].
Finally, the derivation of (c) is provided in Appendix B.
3) Achievable secrecy rate: From (11) and (14), we can define the achievable secrecy rate of
user 1 as follows:
∆ = I1 (s1; z1)− IE (s1; zE)
≥ log2 ((1 + snr1)/(1 + snrE)) , Rsec (17)
in which the explicit expressions for snr1 and snrE are presented in (12) and (16), respectively.
In order to facilitate further analysis in the rest of paper, we denote Ψ be the matrix in which
the (m, k)th entry is Ψ(m, k) =
√
ηmk. The kth column vector of Ψ is denoted as
uk = Ψ(:, k) = [
√
η1k,
√
η2k, . . . ,
√
ηMk]
T .
Besides, we also define the following matrices and vectors
ak =
√
ρs [γ1k, γ2k, . . . , γMk]
T ,
Akk′ =
√
ρsdiag
(√
β1kγ1k′, . . . ,
√
βMkγMk′
)
,
BE =
√
ρsdiag
(√
γ11 (γ1E + β1E), . . . ,
√
γM1 (γME + βME)
)
Bk′ =
√
ρsdiag
(√
β1Eγ1k′, . . . ,
√
βMEγMk′
)
with k′ 6= 1.
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Finally, the SNRs in (12) and (16) can be rewritten in a more elegant way as follows:
snrk =
(
aTkuk
)2/
ϕk(Ψ), (18)
snrE = ‖BEu1‖2
/
ϕE(Ψ) (19)
where
ϕk(Ψ) =
K∑
k′=1
‖Akk′uk′‖2 + 1, k ∈ K, (20)
ϕE(Ψ) =
K∑
k′ 6=1
‖Bk′uk′‖2 + 1. (21)
All SNR-related expressions are now presented as functions of Ψ instead of {ηmk}m,k. Given
that ηmk decides the amount of the mth AP’s power destined for the k user, the (m, k)th entry
of Ψ is also referred to as the factor deciding how much transmit power used by the mth AP
and destined for the k user.
III. SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we aim to design the matrix Ψ to maximize either the achievable data rate of
user 1 (in nats/s/Hz), i.e. ln (1 + snr1), or its achievable secrecy rate ln (1 + snr1)− ln (1 + snrE1)
in improving the secure performance of our system. Prior to performing these tasks, however, we
need to impose a critical condition on the power at each AP. The power constraint is described
as follows:
• Let Pmax be the maximum transmit power of each AP, i.e. Pmax ≥ E {|xm|2}. From (7),
the average transmit power for the mth AP can be given by
E
{|xm|2} = Ps K∑
k=1
ηmkγmk. (22)
With the power constraint on every AP, we have
K∑
k=1
Ψ2(m, k)γmk ≤ ρmax
ρs
, m ∈M (23)
with M = {1, . . . ,M}. Note that ρmax = Pmax/N0 is viewed as the maximum possible
ratio of the mth AP’s average transmit power to the average noise power.
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Now we begin with optimizing Ψ to maximize the achievable data rate of the 1st user (who
is under attack), i.e.
(P1) max
Ψ
ln
(
1 +
(
aT1 u1
)2/
ϕ1(Ψ)
)
(24a)
s.t. (23), (24b)
‖BEu1‖2
ϕE(Ψ)
≤ θE, (24c)(
aTk uk
)2
ϕk(Ψ)
≥ θk, k ∈ K\{1}. (24d)
Herein, optimizingΨ is equivalent to finding the optimal value of every power control coefficient
ηmk (because of the relation Ψ(m, k) =
√
ηmk).
The constraint (23) is to control the transmit power at each AP as previously described.
The constraint (24c) requires that the greatest amount of information Eve can captures will not
exceed some predetermined threshold, i.e. ln (1 + snrE) ≤ ln(1+θE). Finally, the constraint (24d)
guarantees that the achievable data rate of user k ∈ K\{1} is equal to or greater than some
target threshold, i.e. ln (1 + snrk) ≥ ln(1 + θk).
Similarly, we will optimize every ηmk (through optimizing the coefficient matrix Ψ) to max-
imize the achievable secrecy rate of user 1, i.e.
(Q1) max
Ψ
ln

1 + (aT1 u1)2
/
ϕ1(Ψ)
1 + ‖BEu1‖2
/
ϕE(Ψ)

 (25a)
s.t. (23), (24d). (25b)
It should be noted that both problems (P1) and (Q1) has been considered in [27] and [28] in
the context of conventional MIMO systems, information and energy transfer. Inspired by these
two works, we also use path-following algorithms to solve non-convex optimization problems.
As can be seen in the subsections below, each of the proposed path-following algorithms invokes
only one simple convex quadratic program at each iteration and thus, at least a locally optimal
solution can be found out.
A. Solving problem (P1)
We can see that the constraint (23) is obviously convex, while (24d) is the following second-
order cone (SOC) constraint and thus convex:
1√
θk
aTkuk ≥
√
ϕk(Ψ), k ∈ K\{1}. (26)
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Besides, we observe that the objective function of (P1) can be replaced with
(
aT1 u1
)2/
ϕ1(Ψ).
Let Ψ(κ) be a feasible point for (P1) found from the (κ− 1)th iteration. By using the inequality
x2
y
≥ 2 x¯
y¯
x− x¯
2
y¯2
y ∀ x > 0, y > 0, x¯ > 0, y¯ > 0 (27)
we obtain (
aT1 u1
)2
ϕ1(Ψ)
≥ f (κ)1 (Ψ) , a(κ)aT1 u1 − b(κ)ϕ1(Ψ) (28)
with
a(κ) = 2
(
aT1 u
(κ)
1
)2
ϕ1(Ψ(κ))
, b(κ) = (a(κ)/2)2. (29)
As such, maximizing
(
aT1 u1
)2/
ϕ1(Ψ) is now equivalent to maximizing f
(κ)
1 (Ψ). Finally, con-
sidering the function ϕE(Ψ) in (24c), we find that it is convex quadratic and thus, the non-convex
constraint (24c) is innerly approximated by the convex quadratic constraint3
‖BEu1‖2
/
θE ≤ ϕ(κ)E (Ψ) (30)
for
ϕ
(κ)
E (Ψ) ,
K∑
k 6=1
[
u
(κ)
k
T
B2k
(
2uk − u(κ)k
)]
+ 1. (31)
Having the approximations (28) and (30), at κ-th iteration we solve the following convex
optimization to generate a feasible point Ψ(κ+1):
max
Ψ
f
(κ)
1 (Ψ) s.t. (23), (26), (30). (32)
The problem (32) involvesMK scalar real variables (becauseΨ hasMK entries) and ǫ = M+K
quadratic constraints. According to [28], the per-iteration cost to solve (32) isO ((MK)2ǫ2.5 + ǫ3.5).
To find a feasible point for (P1) to initialize the above procedure, we address the problem
min
Ψ
‖BEu1‖2
/
θE − ϕE(Ψ) s.t. (23), (26). (33)
Initialized by any feasible pointΨ(0) for convex constraints (23) and (26), we iterate the following
optimization problem
min
Ψ
‖BEu1‖2
/
θE − ϕ(κ)E (Ψ) s.t. (23), (26), (34)
till ∥∥∥BEu(κ)1 ∥∥∥2/θE − ϕE (Ψ(κ)) ≤ 0, (35)
so Ψ(κ) is feasible for (P1). To sum up, we provide the following algorithm:
3The right hand side of (30) is the first-order Taylor approximation of ϕE(Ψ) near Ψ
(κ). With ϕE(Ψ) being convex, we have
ϕ
(κ)
E (Ψ) ≤ ϕE(Ψ).
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Algorithm 1 Path-following algorithm for solving (P1)
1: Initialization: Set κ = 0 with a feasible point Ψ(0) for (P1).
2: repeat
3: Solve (32) to obtain the optimal solution Ψ(κ+1).
4: Reset κ := κ+ 1.
5: until Converge.
6: return Ψ(κ) as the desired result.
B. Solving problem (Q1)
By using the inequality [29]
ln
(
1 +
x2
y
)
≥ ln
(
1 +
x¯2
y¯
)
+
x¯2
y¯
1 + x¯
2
y¯
(
2− x¯
2x− x¯ −
y
y¯
)
for ∀ x > 0, x¯ > 0, y > 0, y¯ > 0, 2x > x¯ (36)
we obtain
ln
(
1 +
(
aT1 u1
)2
ϕ1(Ψ)
)
≥ a(κ) + b(κ)
(
2− ϕ1(Ψ)
ϕ1(Ψ(κ))
− (a
T
1 u
(κ)
1 )
2
2aT1 u
(κ)
1 a
T
1 u1 − (aT1 u(κ)1 )2
)
, f (κ)(Ψ) (37)
over the trust region
2aT1 u
(κ)
1 a
T
1 u1 − (aT1 u(κ)1 )2 > 0 (38)
for
a(κ) = ln
(
1 + t(κ)
)
,
b(κ) = t(κ)
/(
1 + t(κ)
)
,
t(κ) =
(
aT1 u
(κ)
1
)2/
ϕ1
(
Ψ(κ)
)
.
In addition, by respectively using the inequality [29]
ln(1 + x) ≤ ln(1 + x¯)− x¯
1 + x¯
+
x
x¯+ 1
, ∀ x > 0, x¯ > 0 (39)
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and the fact that ϕ
(κ)
E (Ψ) ≤ ϕE(Ψ) (please see Footnote 2), we obtain
ln
(
1 +
‖BEu1‖2
ϕE(Ψ)
)
≤ c(κ) + d(κ)‖BEu1‖
2
ϕE(Ψ)
≤ c(κ) + d(κ)‖BEu1‖
2
ϕ
(κ)
E (Ψ)
, g(κ)(Ψ) (40)
over the trust region
ϕ
(κ)
E (Ψ) > 0 (41)
for
c(κ) = ln(1 + t
(κ)
E )− t(κ)E
/(
1 + t
(κ)
E
)
,
d(κ) = 1
/(
1 + t
(κ)
E
)
,
t
(κ)
E =
∥∥∥BEu(κ)1 ∥∥∥2/ϕE (Ψ(κ)) .
Initialized by a feasible pointΨ(0) for the convex constraints (23) and (26), at κ-th iteration for
κ = 0, 1, . . . , we solve the following convex optimization problem to generate the next feasible
point Ψ(κ+1):
max
Ψ
f (κ)(Ψ)− g(κ)(Ψ) (42a)
s.t. (23), (26), (38), (41). (42b)
With MK scalar real variables, 2 linear constraints and (ǫ − 1) quadratic constraints, the per-
iteration cost to solve (42) is O ((MK)2(ǫ− 1)2.5 + (ǫ− 1)3.5).
As such, the problem (Q1) can be solved by using the following algorithm:
Algorithm 2 Path-following algorithm for solving (Q1)
1: Initialization: Set κ = 0 with a feasible point Ψ(0) for (Q1).
2: repeat
3: Solve (42) to obtain the optimal solution Ψ(κ+1).
4: Reset κ := κ+ 1.
5: until Converge.
6: return Ψ(κ) as the desired result.
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IV. POWER MINIMIZATION
In this section, we aim to design the matrix Ψ to minimize the total average transmit power
of all APs subject to security constraints as well as other SNR-based constraints:
(R1) min
Ψ
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
Ψ2(m, k)γmk (43a)
s.t. (23), (24c), (43b)(
aTkuk
)2
ϕk(Ψ)
≥ θk, k ∈ K (43c)
and
(S1) min
Ψ
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
Ψ2(m, k)γmk (44a)
s.t. (23), (26), (44b)
ln

1 + (aT1 u1)2
/
ϕ1(Ψ)
1 + ‖BEu1‖2
/
ϕE(Ψ)

 ≥ rφ. (44c)
Again, Ψ(m, k) is the (m, k)th entry of the matrix Ψ. Due to the relation Ψ(m, k) =
√
ηmk,
finding Ψ is equivalent to finding every power control coefficient ηmk (m ∈M and k ∈ K).
In addition, the objective function is the total power radiated by the antennas of APs. The
power consumed by other components (such as the backhaul and the CPU) is beyond the scope
of this paper.
Note that (43c) is not exactly the same as (26) because (43c) contains one more constraint,
i.e. snr1 ≥ θ1. Meanwhile, rφ in the program (S1) is the given threshold which a designer may
want to obtain. In general, we will have different results (which of course leads to different
secure performances) when using (R1) and (S1). However, the obtained results can also be the
same when using these programs, depending on the given values of θ1, θE and rφ.
A. Solving problem (R1)
At κ-th iteration, we solve the following convex optimization problem to generalize the next
iterative feasible point Ψ(κ+1)
min
Ψ
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
Ψ2(m, k)γmk (45a)
s.t. (23), (26), (30). (45b)
Similar to (32), the computational complexity of solving (45) is also O ((MK)2ǫ2.5 + ǫ3.5).
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Note that a feasible point Ψ(0) for (R1) can be found in the same way as (P1). Furthermore,
the algorithm for solving (R1) is presented below.
Algorithm 3 Path-following algorithm for solving (R1)
1: Initialization: Set κ = 0 with a feasible point Ψ(0) for (R1).
2: repeat
3: Solve (45) to obtain the optimal solution Ψ(κ+1).
4: Reset κ := κ+ 1.
5: until Converge.
6: return Ψ(κ) as the desired result.
B. Solving problem (S1)
At κ-th iteration, we solve the following convex optimization problem to generalize the next
iterative feasible point Ψ(κ+1):
min
Ψ
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
Ψ2(m, k)γmk (46a)
s.t. (23), (26), (46b)
f (κ)(Ψ)− g(κ)(Ψ) ≥ rφ. (46c)
Similar to (32) and (45), the computational complexity of solving (46) is alsoO ((MK)2ǫ2.5 + ǫ3.5).
Note that a feasible point Ψ(0) for (S1) can be found like that for (Q1). Finally, we provide
the detailed algorithm for solving (S1) as follows:
Algorithm 4 Path-following algorithm for solving (S1)
1: Initialization: Set κ = 0 with a feasible point Ψ(0) for (S1).
2: repeat
3: Solve (46) to obtain the optimal solution Ψ(κ+1).
4: Reset κ := κ+ 1.
5: until Converge.
6: return Ψ(κ) as the desired result.
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V. OPTIMIZATION UNDER EQUAL POWER ALLOCATION AT ACCESS POINTS
In this section, we reconsider the proposed optimization problems with ηmk being equal to η
(for all m and k) for comparison purposes.
Plugging ηmk = η into (12)–(16), we obtain the special expressions for snrk and snrE as
follows:
snrk|ηmk=η = ηωk/ (ηω˘k + 1) , (47)
snrE|ηmk=η =
η̟
η ˘̟ + 1
(48)
where
ωk = ρs
(
M∑
m=1
γmk
)2
,
ω˘k = ρs
K∑
k′=1
M∑
m=1
γmk′βmk,
̟ = ρs
M∑
m=1
γm1
(
ρEβ
2
mE
ρuβ
2
m1
γm1 + βmE
)
,
˘̟ = ρs
K∑
k′ 6=1
M∑
m=1
γmk′βmE.
Then, problems (P1) and (Q1) reduce to
(P1) max
η
ηω1/ (ηω˘1 + 1) (49a)
s.t. η ≤ ρmax/ρs∑K
k=1 γmk
, m ∈M (49b)
η (̟ − θE ˘̟ ) ≤ θE, (49c)
η (ωk − θkω˘k) ≥ θk, k ∈ K\{1} (49d)
and
(Q1) max
η
(
1 +
ηω1
ηω˘1 + 1
)/(
1 +
η̟
η ˘̟ + 1
)
(50a)
s.t. (49b), (49d). (50b)
Similarly, problems (R1) and (S1) reduce to
(R1) min
η
η (51a)
s.t. (49b), (49c), (51b)
ηωk
(ηω˘k + 1)
≥ θk, k ∈ K (51c)
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and
(S1) min
η
η (52a)
s.t. (49b), (49d), (52b)
1 + ηω1/ (ηω˘1 + 1)
1 + η̟/ (η ˘̟ + 1)
≥ φ. (52c)
A. Closed-form solutions to (P1)
The objective function of (P1) increases in η. Hence, maximizing that objective function is
equivalent to maximizing η. In other words, we will solve the following problem
(P1) max
η
η (53a)
s.t. (49b), (49c), (49d). (53b)
In order for (49d) to be meaningful, we need the condition
(ωk − θkω˘k) > 0⇔ θk < ωk/ω˘k (54)
with k ∈ K\{1}. If θk satisfies the above condition, we can infer from both (49b) and (49d) the
following:
max
k∈K\{1}
{
θk
ωk − θkω˘k
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≤ η ≤ min
m∈M
{
ρmax/ρs∑K
k=1 γmk
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
This also implies another necessary condition as follows:
θk <
ωkminm∈M
{
ρmax/ρs
∑
K
k=1 γmk
}
1 + ω˘kminm∈M
{
ρmax/ρs
∑
K
k=1 γmk
} (55)
for each k ∈ K\{1}. The two conditions (54) and (55) are now rewritten in the following form:
θk < min

ωkω˘k ,
ωkminm∈M
{
ρmax/ρs
∑
K
k=1 γmk
}
1 + ω˘kminm∈M
{
ρmax/ρs
∑
K
k=1 γmk
}

 (56)
with k ∈ K\{1}. Once (56) has been satisfied, the solution to (P1) can be given by
• either
η⋆(P1) = min
m∈M
{
ρmax/ρs∑K
k=1 γmk
}
(57)
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for
θE ≥ ̟/ ˘̟ (58)
• or
η⋆(P1) = min
m∈M
{
ρmax/ρs∑K
k=1 γmk
,
θE
(̟ − θE ˘̟ )
}
(59)
for
̟maxk∈K\{1}
{
θk
ωk−θkω˘k
}
1 + ˘̟ maxk∈K\{1}
{
θk
ωk−θkω˘k
} ≤ θE < ̟/ ˘̟ . (60)
B. Closed-form solution to (Q1)
As presented in the previous subsection, (56) is necessary in order that (Q1) can be solved.
Then we can rewrite (Q1) as
(Q1) max
χ
l(χ) (61a)
s.t. 0 ≤ χ ≤ α (61b)
where
χ , η − α,
α , min
m∈M
{
ρmax/ρs∑K
k=1 γmk
}
− α,
α , max
k∈K\{1}
{
θk
ωk − θkω˘k
}
and
l(χ) = χ(ω1+ω˘1)+α(ω1+ω˘1)+1
χω˘1+αω˘1+1
χ ˘̟ +α ˘̟ +1
χ(̟+ ˘̟ )+α(̟+ ˘̟ )+1
.
Introducing a new variable τ ≥ 0 and defining a Lagrangian function L (χ, τ) , l(χ)−τ(χ−α),
we first consider two sub-cases:
• For τ = 0, we solve ∂l(χ)
∂χ
= 0 to obtain two positive-real critical points χ = χ1 and χ = χ2
(if possible).
• For τ > 0, we solve the system of two equations

∂L (χ, τ)
∂τ
= 0
∂L (χ, τ)
∂χ
= 0
⇔


χ = α
τ =
∂l (χ)
∂χ
∣∣∣∣
χ=α
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to obtain another critical point χ = α , χ3.
Then the optimal solution to
(
Q1
)
can be given by
η⋆(Q1) = α + argmax
χ∈{χ1,χ2,χ3}
l (χ) . (62)
C. Closed-form solution to (R1)
Similar to (P1), we first need the condition (56) with k ∈ {1, . . . , K} in order that (R1) can
be solved. Then we can attain the solution to (R1), i.e.
η⋆(R1) = max
k∈K
{
θk
ωk − θkω˘k
}
, (63)
in the case that either (58) or (60) is satisfied.
D. Closed-form solutions to (S1)
For (S1), the condition (56) (with k ∈ {2, . . . , K}) is also required. The third constraint
(52c) is rewritten in the form a˘η2 + b˘η + c˘ ≥ 0 with a˘ = ˘̟ (ω1 + ω˘1) − φω˘1 ( ˘̟ +̟), b˘ =
ω1 + ω˘1 + ˘̟ − φ (ω˘1 + ˘̟ +̟) and c˘ = 1− φ. As such, there are two possibilities as follows:
• If a˘ > 0, then (52c) always holds for b˘2 − 4a˘c˘ ≤ 0. In this case, the solution to (S1) is
given by
η⋆(S1) = max
k∈K\{1}
{
θk
ωk − θkω˘k
}
. (64)
• If a˘ < 0, then (52c) holds for b˘2 − 4a˘c˘ > 0 and η1 ≤ η ≤ η2 given that η1 and η2 are
the solutions to the quadratic equation a˘η2 + b˘η + c˘ = 0. In this case, (S1) is infeasible if
η2 < 0; otherwise, the solution to (S1) is given by
η⋆(S1) = max
k∈K\{1}
{
θk
ωk − θkω˘k , η1
}
. (65)
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the secure performance and make comparisons for different sce-
narios. More specifically, we measure the secure performance by calculating Rsec (in nats/s/Hz)
at
• Ψ = Ψ⋆(P1) (the solution to (P1));
• Ψ = Ψ⋆(Q1) (the solution to (Q1));
• Ψ = Ψ⋆(R1) (the solution to (R1));
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• Ψ = Ψ⋆(S1) (the solution to (S1));
• η⋆(P1) (the solution to (P1));
• η⋆
(Q1)
(the solution to
(
Q1
)
);
• η⋆(R1) (the solution to (R1));
• η⋆(S1) (the solution to (S1)).
For each case, the obtained value of Rsec will be denoted by Rsec (P1), Rsec (Q1), Rsec (R1),
Rsec (S1), Rsec (P1), Rsec
(
Q1
)
, Rsec (R1) and Rsec (S1), respectively. Likewise, the notation
Ptot (R1), Ptot (S1), Ptot (R1), and Ptot (S1) will stand for “ the total average transmit power of
all APs at Ψ = Ψ⋆(R1), Ψ = Ψ
⋆
(S1), η = η
⋆
(R1), and η = η
⋆
(S1), respectively.”
As for simulation parameters, we use the Hata-COST231 model (see [2], [19] and [20]) to
imitate the large scale fading coefficients, i.e.
βmk = 10
(S+PL(dmk))/10, (66)
βmE = 10
(S+PL(dmE))/10 (67)
where S ∼ CN (0, σ2S) presents the shadowing fading effect with the standard deviation σS = 8
dB and
PL (d) =


−139.4− 35 log10(d) if d > 0.05
−119.9− 20 log10(d) if d ∈ (0.01, 0.05]
−79.9 if d ≤ 0.01
(68)
represents the path loss in dB with d ≡ dmk (or d ≡ dmE) being the distance in km between the
mth AP and user k (or Eve).4 In addition, the maximum transmit power of each AP is Pmax = 1
W. Meanwhile, the average noise power (in W) is given by
N0 = bandwidth× kB × T0 × noise figure (69)
where kB = 1.38 × 10−23 (Joule/Kelvin) is the Boltzmann constant, and T0 = 290 (Kelvin) is
the noise temperature. In all simulation results, we suppose that the bandwidth is 20 MHz and
the noise figure is 9 dB. Finally, other parameters will be mentioned whenever they are used.
4Other presentations for PL (d) are also available in literature. Herein, (68) is suggested for a practical scenario in which the
carrier frequency is 1900 MHz, the heigh of each AP antenna is 20 m, the heigh of each user antenna (as well as that of Eve
antenna) is 1.5 m and all nodes (APs, users and Eve) are randomly dispersed over a square of size 1× 1 km2 [2, Eqs. (52) and
(53)].
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Problem (P1)
Fig. 2. Secrecy rate versus Ps (the average transmit power for a signal sk). Other parameters: the average transmit power
of each user is Pu = {0.3, 0.6} W, the average transmit power of Eve is PE = {0.1, 0.5} W, M = 50, K = 8, T = 12,
θE = 10
−4, and θk = 2× 10−4 for k = {2, . . . ,K}.
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Fig. 3. Secrecy rate versus Ps (the average transmit power for a signal sk). Other parameters: the average transmit power of
each user is Pu = {0.3, 0.6} W, the average transmit power of Eve is PE = {0.1, 0.5} W, M = 50, K = 8, T = 12 and
θk = 2× 10−4 for k = {2, . . . , K}.
In Figure 2, we show the achievable secrecy rate (in nats/s/Hz) in 2 different cases: i) Ψ =
Ψ⋆(P1) and ii) η = η
⋆
(P1). For each case, 3 different sub-cases of (Pu, PE) are considered. It is
observed that Rsec (P1) is significantly higher than Rsec (P1). In fact, the obtained values of
Rsec (P1) fall within the interval (0.55, 0.57) nats/s/Hz. In other words, having ηmk = η
⋆ (for
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Fig. 4. Secrecy rate versus M . Other parameters: the average transmit power for a signal sk is Ps = 0.8 W, the average
transmit power of each user is Pu = {0.3, 0.6} W, the average transmit power of Eve is PE = {0.2, 0.7} W, K = 8, T = 12,
θk = 2× 10−4 for k = {2, . . . , K} and θE = θk/50.
30 35 40 45 50
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
 Pu = 0.6 W  and  PE = 0.2 W
 Pu = 0.3 W  and  PE = 0.2 W
 Pu = 0.3 W  and  PE = 0.7 W
M
 
S
e
cr
e
cy
 R
a
te
 (
n
a
ts
/s
/H
z
)
 
Problem (Q1)
Fig. 5. Secrecy rate versus M . Other parameters: the average transmit power for a signal sk is Ps = 0.8 W, the average
transmit power of each user is Pu = {0.3, 0.6} W, the average transmit power of Eve is PE = {0.2, 0.7} W, K = 8, T = 12
and θk = 2× 10−4 for k = {2, . . . , K}.
all m and k) will lead to very poor performance in terms of security. Furthermore, the secure
performance increases with Pu and reduces with PE (the average transmit power of Eve).
Figure 3 shows the achievable secrecy rate versus Ps in two cases: i) Ψ = Ψ
⋆
(Q1) and ii)
η = η⋆
(Q1)
. The secure performance in the first case is significantly higher than the second case.
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Fig. 6. Total power of all APs (in mW) versus Ps (the average transmit power for a signal sk). Other parameters: the average
transmit power of each user is Pu = {0.1, 1} W, the average transmit power of Eve is PE = 0.5 W, M = 50, K = 8, T = 12,
θ1 = 0.1, θk = 0.02 for k = {2, . . . ,K} and θE = θ1/50.
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Fig. 7. Total power of all APs (in mW) versus Ps (the average transmit power for a signal sk). Other parameters: the average
transmit power of each user is Pu = {0.1, 1} W, the average transmit power of Eve is PE = 0.5 W, M = 50, K = 8, T = 12,
θk = 0.02 for k = {2, . . . ,K} and φ = 1.
Moreover, the changes in the value of Rsec
(
Q1
)
are minor, i.e. Rsec
(
Q1
)
falls within (0.67, 0.79)
nats/s/Hz. We also observe that Rsec (Q1) is improved with increasing Pu and is impaired with
PE. Meanwhile, Rsec
(
Q1
)
slightly decreases with Pu.
In Figures 4 and 5, the achievable secrecy rates Rsec (P1) and Rsec (Q1) are depicted as
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Fig. 8. Total power of all APs (in mW) versus M . Other parameters: the average transmit power for a signal sk is Ps = 0.7
W, the average transmit power of each user is Pu = 0.4 W, the average transmit power of Eve is PE = 0.5 W, K = {6, 8, 10},
T = 12, θ1 = 0.1, θk = 0.02 for k = {2, . . . ,K} and θE = θ1/50.
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Fig. 9. Total power of all APs (in mW) versus M . Other parameters: the average transmit power for a signal sk is Ps = 0.7
W, the average transmit power of each user is Pu = 0.4 W, the average transmit power of Eve is PE = 0.5 W, K = {6, 8, 10},
T = 12, θk = 0.02 for k = {2, . . . ,K} and φ = 1.
functions of M . We can see that both of them increase with M . It implies that the more service
APs we have, the higher secure performance we gain. Finally, Rsec (P1) as well as Rsec (Q1)
increases with Pu and decreases with PE. With the chosen parameters, (Q1) appears better than
(P1) in terms of secrecy rate. Overall, PE represents the strength of an actively eavesdropping
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attack; thus, we can observe that the secure performance is degraded when PE grows as shown
in Figures 2-5.
Figure 6 shows that Ptot (R1) is much higher than Ptot (R1) which is around 0.003 mW with
every Ps. It means that the solutionΨ
⋆
(R1) is much better than the solution η
⋆
(P1) in terms of energy,
because the APs do not have to consume too much energy to meet security requirements. Besides,
the figure also shows that Ptot (R1) inversely decreases with Ps and is lowest at Ps = Pmax.
Finally, we observe that when Ps changes, Rsec (R1) ≈ 0.0953 nats/s/Hz remains almost constant;
meanwhile, Rsec (R1) ≈ 0.5386 nats/s/Hz with Pu = 0.1 W and 0.5091 nats/s/Hz with Pu = 1
W.
Figure 7 shows that Ptot (S1) is much higher than Ptot (S1) which is around 0.0027 mW at
each considered value of Ps. This result also reveals that (R1) is the better program in terms of
energy, because there is really less energy required for security. Besides, the figure also shows
that Ptot (S1) inversely decreases with Ps and is lowest at Ps = Pmax. Finally, we record that
Rsec (S1) ≈ 0+ nats/s/Hz when Ps changes. In contrast, Rsec (S1) ≈ 0.4619 nats/s/Hz with
Pu = 0.1 W and 0.4521 nats/s/Hz with Pu = 1W.
Figure 8 depicts Ptot (R1) as a function of M . With 3 different values of K, we observe that
the total power consumption reduces with M but increases with K. We can see that (R1) can
be solved with many different values of (M,K). Among them, the best choice is to choose
M as large as possible while K should be as small as possible. For example, the system with
(M,K) = (70, 6) will require less power consumption (at APs) than the system with (M,K) =
(50, 10), while the security constraints remain guaranteed.
Figure 9 depicts Ptot (S1) as a function of M . Our observation of this figure is similar to
Figure 8. We should choose M as large as possible and K as small as possible in order to attain
the best performance (as long as the security constraints are satisfied). When M is large enough,
the total power consumption is nearly zero and yet, the secrecy rate is also around zero (with
the chosen parameters).
In comparison between Figure 8 and Figure 9, one can find the two differences: i) the presence
of θE and the absence of φ in Figure 8; and ii) the absence of θE and the absence of φ in Figure
9. It is because of the fact that (R1) and (S1) have different security constraints. With the setup
parameters, (S1) offers better performance than (R1) because the required power consumption
is lower (i.e., the curves in Figure 9 is slightly lower than those in Figure 8).
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered a cell-free MIMO network in the presence of an active
eavesdropper. We have suggested maximization problems to maximize the achievable secrecy
rate subject to quality-of-service constraints. Also, minimization problems have been provided
to minimize power consumption as long as security requirements are still guaranteed. In finding
the optimal values of the power control coefficients {ηmk}m,k, we have considered two different
cases: i) ηmk changes with m and k; and ii) ηmk = η for all m and k. Through numerical
results, we have found that the case of ηmk = η will lead to far worse performance than the
other case. Based on numerical results and intuitive observations, a trade-off problem between
secrecy rate and energy consumption may be considered for cell-free networks in the future.
Besides, preventing Eve’s intrusion into the pilot training will be also worth considering.
APPENDIX
A. A Simple Method to Identify Abnormality in Pilot Training
As presented in Subsection II.A, the mth AP receives the array of signals {ykm}Kk=1 after
calculating the Hermitian inner product between yp,m and pk. Then all APs (through the CPU)
exchange information and make a calculation of
Y ,
M∑
m=1
E
{|y1m|2}
to check if Eve tries to overhear the signal transmitted from APs to user 1. If H0 denotes the
hypothesis that there is no active eavesdropping and H1 denotes the opposite, then two possibly
obtained values of Y are
Y|H0 = Tρu
M∑
m=1
βm1 +M,
Y|H1 = Tρu
M∑
m=1
βm1 + TρE
M∑
m=1
βmE +M.
It is clear that Y|H1 > Y|H0 always holds for ρE > 0. Therefore, APs simply compare Y with
Y|H0 to make the decision, i.e.
• Y = Y|H0 ⇔ No active eavesdropping.
• Y > Y|H0 ⇔ Eve is seeking to attack the system.
Note that Y|H0 is a known value and is referred to as the only threshold (which APs need) to
check any abnormality in pilot training related to the pilot p1.
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In fact, the above-mentioned detection method can be performed without knowing the value
of ρE. However, ρE can also be predicted by
ρE =
Y − Y|H0
T
∑M
m=1 βmE
in the case that active eavesdropping occurs.
B. Explicit expression for snrE
We first calculate
E
{|BUE,1|2} = ρs M∑
m=1
ηm1 E
{|gmEgˆ∗m1|2}
(a)
= ρs
M∑
m=1
ηm1E
{|(emE + gˆmE) gˆ∗m1|2}
= ρs
M∑
m=1
ηm1
(
E
{|gˆmEgˆ∗m1|2}+ E{|emE|2 |gˆ∗m1|2})
(b)
= ρs
M∑
m=1
ηm1
[
2αmγ
2
m1 + (βmE − γmE) γm1
]
(c)
= ρs
M∑
m=1
ηm1
(
αmγ
2
m1 + βmEγm1
)
= ρs
M∑
m=1
ηm1
[(
ρEβ
2
mE
ρuβ2m1
)
γ2m1 + βmEγm1
]
(70)
where (a) is obtained by substituting gmE = emE+ gˆmE with emE , gmE− gˆmE being the channel
estimation error for the link between the mth AP and Eve. In deriving (a), we also use the fact
that emE ∼ CN (0, βmE − γmE) is independent of gˆmE. The equality (b) is obtained by using (6).
Meanwhile, (c) results from the substitution of γmE = αmγm1.
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Similarly, for k′ 6= 1, we calculate
E
{|UIE,k′|2} = ρsE


∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
m=1
√
ηmk′gmEgˆ
∗
mk′
∣∣∣∣∣
2


= ρs
M∑
m=1
ηmk′
(
E
{|gˆmEgˆ∗mk′|2}+ E{|emEgˆ∗mk′|2})
(a)
= ρs
M∑
m=1
ηmk′
(
αmE
{|gˆm1gˆ∗mk′|2}+ E{|emE|2 |gˆ∗mk′ |2})
(b)
= ρs
M∑
m=1
ηmk′ [αmγm1γmk′ + (βmE − αmγm1) γmk′]
= ρs
M∑
m=1
ηmk′βmEγmk′ (71)
where (a) is obtained by using (4) and (b) results from the substitution of (5).
Finally, substituting (70) and (71) into (15) yields (16).
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